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Abstract 
 
The African continent provides majority of the world’s raw material for 
technology and fine jewelry.  Countries dependent on their extractive industries 
lag behind on developmental goals. Their GDPs are high as well as their 
national poverty levels. This paper explores the factors in which a nation lacks 
development when it is financially wealthy to do so.  There are similar patterns 
in nations where resource curse has occurred. What is the key to sustainable 
development in Sub-Saharan Africa?  Is solving corruption and migrating away 
from a market dependent on primary exports the answer? Can they transition 
from the ancient patrimonial state to democracy?  The paper explores the 
patterns, the results and perhaps a change.  
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Introduction Background: 
  
 Do natural resource economies hinder development in Sub-Saharan Africa? 
The current works on the subject argue on both sides where resource rich 
economies do develop at a lower rate and long-term development is hindered but 
also in some other cases natural resource economies are not affected and do not 
suffer from under development.  The significant difference is in the sampled states.   
In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, the published works tend to lean towards 
oil economies having a negative effect on development in places it is needed the 
most like tropical Africa. This is evident by looking at economies annual GDP and 
also development growth rate. There is evidence of resource abundance that is not 
translating into development.  However, in other regions of the world where 
abundant resources are present, development is not so much hindered. Such places 
are like Brazil, Australia and Norway. So the question then becomes if the same 
variable being natural resource economy reacts differently in different states, what 
are the other variables in a rentier economy that might perhaps change the 
outcome? Current works explore the same questions on what variables are also part 
of the concept of resource curse.  
In this thesis I hypothesize that there are three factors which hinder 
development in resource-rich states: the corrupt nature of many post colonial 
states, the value of the commodity to the state (state dependency on the 
commodity), and the role of Multinational Corporations (MNCs). Is the development 
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of the state hindered by its patrimonial nature? Is there any correlation between 
MNCs involvement and lack of development within oil exporting nations in Africa? 
What practices by the State and MNC prevent these host nations from developing 
when their GDP is ranked among the highest on the continent?  
My interest in these three factors is because each one is connected and 
operates together in a resource dependant economy.  I place a value on each factor 
on this linear equation that results in resource curse. The state is the official 
“parent” on all resources within its borders. Any form of exploration and 
exploitation is with the states permission. With that being said, there is no resource 
contributing to the national GDP without the government knowing about it.  The 
state takes the role of managing natural resource funds. What happens when the 
nature of the state is not so accountable and positive?  We start to see negative 
behaviors such as mismanagement of resource funds. Corruption becomes a serious 
problem for development. 
The second variable is the weakness of the economy within a resource 
dependent state.  Diversity is crucial to any economy to survive shifts in the market. 
Natural resource abundant states tend to rely on a commodity and use that as a 
main source of income. Any fluctuation in price and demand will have a severe 
impact on economies that depend on extractive industries. By not diversifying its 
economy, a state cripples its chances of survival in the global market. Also keep in 
mind there is the real possibility of the resource abundance slowly dwindling into 
non-existence, as it is not renewable.  What would be the outcome then when the 
main breadwinner of a state no longer exists?  
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Lastly, my third factor is the presence and influence MNCs have on such 
resource states.  The resource needs to be extracted for use and sale and mostly 
they are done so by foreign corporations.  This is not to say that they are no state 
owned and operated corporations involved in the extraction of natural resources. 
However, the state companies are a few compared to the dozen foreign firms that 
are part of the puzzle.  There is evidence that MNCs are also corrupt along with the 
states that they operate in.  Aside from corruption, there is also a lack of 
environmental responsibility on behalf of MNCs because the government has no 
form of regulations.  Granted it is the nations primary duty to protect its borders 
and also regulating those working within them but in most MNCs cases, they have 
already bought the governments silence and get a blind eye towards most of their 
crimes.  
To test my hypothesis I will examine Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea. I 
will layout their history as a patrimonial oil exporting state and the value of oil to 
their economy. I will also present the MNC’s history within each country and their 
relationship. I will also be looking at their internal government and political 
systems. My method of collecting information will be from various sources such as 
the World Bank, IMF, UN publications and journals as well as current working 
papers in the field of study. The data will include information on levels of 
governance, development, commodity dependency and MNCs history and 
involvement. I will also be using scholarly writers work within the topic regarding 
resource curse cause and effects on development. The last portion of my hypothesis 
is beating and rising from resource curse. I will present a case study of Kuwait as an 
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oil-exporting nation who has not suffered a resource curse.  I will supplement my 
recommendation bases on my findings.  
 Case Studies: In order to support my proposition that three factors hinder 
development in resource-rich states; I will employ the case study method. I have 
chosen these Sub-Saharan countries because they are in the top ten list of oil 
exporting nations in Sub-Saharan Africa, and they each have suffered the resource 
curse. I will analyze cases from Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea. Oil exports 
account for more than half of the national export revenue. I will also be using Kuwait 
as a comparison to analyze why as an oil exporting country Kuwait has not suffered 
the resource curse. Kuwait is also a member of OPEC and has been exporting oil 
since 1946. Oil exports also account for majority of the national export revenues.  
Three Sub-Saharan countries and one Middle Eastern country have similar oil 
exporting industries and yet only one of them has not suffered from the resource 
curse.  
 I will first examine Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea’s development 
statistics post independence. What measures of state building have taken place?  I 
will be using development data from the World Bank and UNICEF to gauge the rate 
of growth in each case study.  There certainly is a rise in national GDP and I want to 
be able to see if there is also a rise in human development. My measure for human 
development is the rate of poverty and growth out of it.   The literatures will also 
supplement critiques of failed state management of the oil industry and revenues, 
the State as a political entity and its structure in regards to the economy, and the 
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MNC’s involvement in general and development as well as oil MNC within Nigeria, 
Angola and Equatorial Guinea.  
 To measure corruption I will use data from Transparency International that 
report on levels of corruption by state officials. I define corruption as the act of 
committing fraud for personal gain (monetary and/or political). The dependence of 
the state on oil can be measured by the GDP of the state and what percentage oil 
contributes to overall exports.  I will be using global finance reports on the value of 
oil to the world and to the home country exporting it.  The role of MNCs within the 
host nations will be analyzed with informational data collected from human rights 
groups 
 Although I hope to find that all three factors are indeed important, I am also 
interested in the varied effects of the factors as they pertain to each of the three 
countries. In other words, it may be that one factor is more important than the 
others and/or that the priority of these factors differ in different states.  
My proposed study is based on the following assumptions. The African 
continent is the second largest oil-exporting region in the world next to the Middle 
East. According to a Larry Diamond (2013) article “Petroleum to People,” a study 
shows that in the coming years there will be approximately $3 trillion of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) pumped into the African economy just from the oil industry.  
There are multiple nations that are oil exporters across the continent; however, the 
fastest growth in the oil industry is concentrated in West Africa.  The West African 
oil and gas market was approximately $21.30 billion for the year of 2013 (OPEC).1  
                                                        
1 OPEC Oil and Gas Market Global Report 
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Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea are among the top ten oil producers and 
exporters on the continent.  Nigeria comes in at first place with 2.2 million barrels 
per day. Angola is third with 1.9 million barrels a day and in seventh place is 
Equatorial Guinea with 346,000 barrels per day. The largest renewable and non-
renewable natural resources in the world are located on the African continent.  The 
oil industry generates billions of dollars annually and is anticipated to grow even 
larger.  
 With such abundant resources, countries should flourish based on the 
revenues from their exports but many writers have noted a trend which they call a 
“curse”. The resource curse refers to the development problems that many nations 
with a high dependency on natural resources face. I propose that the Resource curse 
results from among other things, three combination factors: the corrupt nature of 
many postcolonial states, the value of the commodity to the state and their 
dependency on oil and the role of MNCs.  
The three major oil producing countries in Africa-- Nigeria, Angola and 
Equatorial Guinea- which I have chosen to focus on have suffered the resource curse 
as a result of their oil dependency.  The resource curse stems from corruption and 
lack of governance on a state level, lack of corporate responsibility from MNCs and  
the economic dependency on oil. 
Angola has a population of 21.47 million and an annual GDP of  $124.20 
billion. According to the World Bank 60 percent of the rural community lives at 
poverty levels. 2 Angola is one of the wealthiest nations on the continent.   Oil 
                                                        
2 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD 
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exports make up 95 percent of the total exports and 45 percent of the annual GDP.  
Yet Angola remains underdeveloped.  Over 36 percent of the overall population lives 
in poverty.3 
Nigeria has a population of 178.5 million and an annual GDP of $521.8 billion 
according to the World Bank.4 It is also noted that 46 percent of the population lives 
in poverty.  According to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 
the oil and gas sector accounts for 35 percent of the national GDP and represents 90 
percent of the export revenue. Levels of corruption are high in Nigeria centered on 
missing funds and bribery. According to a New York Times article $20 billion from 
oil sales went unaccounted for from the national bank.  When the head of the 
Nigerian Central Bank investigated, he was fired from his position. 5 
 Equatorial Guinea’s annual GDP was $15.57 billion for the year 2013, oil 
represents 95 percent of the gross domestic product. The country has a small 
population of just over 757,014.  According to a Larry Diamond’s article “Petroleum 
to People” 3 out of 4 Equatorial Guineans live under $2 a day.6 However, President 
Obiang’s family and anyone tied to the Obiangs have amassed fortunes at the 
expense of the state.  There are high levels of corruption that led to the U.S 
Department of Justice to seize property belonging to Teodoro Nguema Obiang 
Mangue, the oldest son of president Obiang in Malibu, California in October 2011.7  
                                                        
3 http://data.worldbank.org/country/angola 
4 http://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria 
5 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/10/world/africa/nigerians-ask-why-oil-
funds-are-missing.html?_r=0 
6 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139647/larry-diamond-and-jack-
mosbacher/petroleum-to-the-people 
.7 Ibid  
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All three nations are not fully democratic states.  State governance in Africa 
tends to be patrimonial for the most part. This is not to say there are no democratic 
nations on the continent, but there are more states that are patrimonial than 
democratic.  After independence, Angola, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea had their 
fair share of unstable governments. There was a scramble for power and elites who 
came to power already had prominent positions during colonial rule and once 
colonization ended, they became presidents and prime ministers. Elites rising to 
such levels of leadership can be described as patrimonial.  This behavior and 
relation between state officials and their method of governing has a patron/clientele 
relationship in the new decolonized neo-patrimonial Africa. 
The resource curse is more prevalent in neo-patrimonial states.  There is a 
correlation between the level of good governance and development achievements 
on the African continent. The state is the main public administrator and is 
responsible for developing the economy within its borders and also protecting state 
and private assets.  In neo-patrimonial states, there is a disconnect between 
compliance and accountability.  As they are un-democratic, there have been cases in 
each selected nations where oil revenues have been mismanaged.  State officials 
often become corrupt and use natural resource revenues for their personal gain 
rather than the wealth and development of a nation. It is also been demonstrated 
that bribes and pay offs have been accepted from foreign investment companies for 
access to the natural resource.8 
                                                        
8 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2006-05-01/long-war-against-
corruption 
 13 
 Natural resources such as oil are mainly extracted and exported by various 
multinational corporations (MNCs) that have struck a deal with the government. 
Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) is an important part of a growing economy, 
especially one that is emerging and is in need of capital. Multinational corporations 
bring a tremendous amount of capital into the host nations. However, there is a 
question about their role in development. Most of the MNCs are located in the 
western world and their FDI is directed towards the “Global South” which is the 
developing world that has the largest amount of growth potential and profit. 
Multinational corporations in sectors such as technology and textiles bring capital 
growth and development to the host nations. However, in the oil sector the outcome 
is often the opposite. The amount of money that is pumped into the nations is 
almost double if not triple that of other sectors. Oil is the most contested sector 
because aside from being a high commodity item on the global market, it comes with 
high risks.   
 Apart from environmental problems such as oil spills, MNCs have had to deal 
with security issues in certain countries where oil pipelines and refineries are at 
risk. Nigeria experienced both a terrible oil spill in 2011 and difficulty securing the 
oil pipelines from rebels.  Angola and Equatorial Guinea suffer from serious 
corruption. These two nations are the wealthiest states in Africa, but due to 
corruption there are records of millions of dollars worth of oil revenue receipts 
missing.  
Before moving on to deal with my hypothesis, I will provide a theoretical 
framework based on relevant literature on neo-patrimonialism and democracy.  
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Literature Review: 
 Resource curse is the negative relationship between resource dependence 
and economic growth. The theory is that natural resource abundant economies 
grow at a slower rate than the resource lacking economies.  It is also referred to as 
the Dutch Disease. There is the question of whether resource curse only appears in 
developing states or travels further than such states. The basic framework is that 
countries that are heavily dependant on natural resource exports develop at a 
slower rate because other sectors of their economy become depreciated and loose 
value. Such dependant economies shy away from developing their manufacturing 
sector. Sachs and Warner (1995) insist that resource curse is the result of the Dutch 
Disease theory and dismiss the possibility that oil corporations and the political 
natures of the state contribute to the oil resource curse.  
 Rodriguez and Sachs (1999) explore the theory that the cause of resource 
curse in resource abundant is the state’s adaption to a sudden boom. They state that 
nations are living beyond their means with newfound wealth that is not renewable 
and steady.  They label it as an “unsustainable high income”.  Income that will soon 
decrease at any moments notice due to fluctuation in demand (oil prices) and 
supply that is not renewable.  They conclude that selling goods at market price and 
investing the revenues to later survive off the interest of revenues reduces the 
chances of a curse rather than effectively blowing through the revenues.   
Among other theories on resource curse and its cause, there are several 
theoretical works on escaping the curse. To escape, one must diagnose the issue and 
either avoid the defect or correct it for the future.  The most common theory on 
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beating the resource curse draws upon the political nature of the state.  What affects 
does the institution have on the economic outcome? 
Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006) explore the roles institutions play in 
resource curse. They identify that the institution is a primary actor in the big picture 
of resource curse.  They examine the institutional arrangements of states that have 
“growth winner” versus “growth losers”. They examine Botswana who is a resource 
exporting state.  Botswana has diamond exports that account for 40% of the GDP 
but due to a “good institution” in place, Botswana performs well and is not affected 
by any resource abundance. 9 Botswana is therefore listed as a growth winner. They 
refer to Ades and Di Talla (1999) to shed light on how resource rents may stimulate 
corruption among politicians and bureaucrats. If there is no good institution in 
place, corruption on high levels is a reality rather than a theory. Based on their 
models, it is concluded that the quality of institution plays a great role in resource 
curse. Unlike Sachs and Warner that do not assign any value to institutions in 
resource curse, Mehlum, Moene, Torvil predict that resource curse can be 
eliminated entirely if institutions played a positive role by maintaining an 
accountable reputation. The Dutch Disease story simply wouldn’t apply.   
If the performance of an institution has an effect on resource curse, what 
about leaders within the institution, what effects do they have on resource curse?   
Institutions are shaped and run by leaders and Cunningham and Casceli (2009) 
examine the multiple layers that leaders have within an institution and how they 
each relate to the resource curse.  They set up their hypothesis by asking the many 
                                                        
9 Mehlun, Moene, Torvil (2006) “Institutions and Resource Curse” 
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ways that resource rents can alter the incentives of a political leader.  In order to 
understand the outcome one must understand the start-- which is the leader’s 
behavior. 
They make two simple categories of centralized and decentralized 
mechanisms.  The centralized mechanism is with a leader that is the recipient of 
resource revenues and benefits directly from it.  The problem comes when its time 
to decide whether to allocate money into investments that can enrich the country or 
retain the money to remain in power.  The patrimonial leader would follow this 
model and choose self-enrichment over national development.  The arrangement for 
collecting resource through the government and its ability and incentives to make 
the most of the revenue determine the resource curse. 10  Other models tested are 
the repressive leader, fatalistic leader, and patronage.  Each one resulted in a 
variation of resource curse.  In patronage, resource was likely and at a higher rate. 
There is an increase in rent resource while a decrease in social investments. There is 
also the need to remain in power and power is bought with state revenues.  
 “Is neo-patrimonialism a pathology, analogy, cause, effect or a term for all of 
Africa’s troubles?”  This is the question that Ann Pitcher, Mary H. Moran and Michael 
Johnson try to answer in their paper Rethinking Patrimonialism and Neo-
patrimonialism in Africa.  Can the nature of the state be the initial point for all the 
problems the nation endures?  Their paper defines what the common definition and 
use of “patrimonial” is when labeling a state as neo-patrimonial. The association of 
patrimonial Africa is not the same as Weber’s patrimonialism. Weber’s (1947) 
                                                        
10 Cunningham and Casceli (2009).  “Leader Behavior and resource Curse” p.633 
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definition referred to the patron and client like relationship between leaders and 
subjects in a political system. Weber also describes the distribution of power is 
based on culture.11  Today, patrimonial has the stigma of “corrupt” attached to it. 
Neo-patrimonial refers to the same guidelines listed by Weber but it is assigned to 
leaders post decolonization, the new patrimonial.  
 The construction of authority and the lack of accountability politically affect 
the state and social welfare of its people.  Pitcher and her colleagues find that states 
that are not associated/labeled with neo-patrimonial leaders often experience 
higher rates of development versus those states with neo-patrimonial practices by 
their leaders.   
There is a collection of “democratic” states in Africa and they all have their 
shortcomings as neo-patrimonial states. They are democratic in a sense, even 
though they are not liberal democracies.  Rod Alence (2004) makes a comparison in 
between the level of development and the governance of political institutions in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. 12 He analyzed a variety of nations where some are considered 
fairly liberal as well as less restrictive governments like Botswana’s and states that 
are less democratic and more restrictive like Angola and Nigeria.  Allence finds that 
there is a positive relationship between states with relatively good governance and 
public administration and the level of development nationally.  States with good 
governance are likely to be more transparent than those that are not practicing good 
governance. So, such “good” states are likely to experience higher development rates 
                                                        
11 Pitcher and Moran (2009) “Rethinking Patriomonialism and Neo-patrimonialism 
in Africa” p. 126 
12 Rod Alence. 2004. “Political Institutions and Development Governance in Sub-
Saharan Africa.” 
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since they are more accountable in their public administration.  The opposite is also 
true where there is likely to be low development in countries with more restrictive 
and non-democratic governments.  A neo-patrimonial state lacks the proper 
governance in public administration, which in turn negatively affects the economic 
and political stability of the country.  The stability measures that Alence used are: 
economic policy coherence, public service effectiveness and limited corruption. 
Nations that were identified as “less restrictive” dealt with less corruption.  
 Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) generally aids in regional economic growth.  
According to Kevin N. Lumbila he indicates that American FDI increased to $148 
billion for the year 2000 compared to only $ 32 billion in 1980. 13 However, Africa 
received little in comparison to other regions within the years 1980-2000. He 
primarily explores the effect FDI has had on other regions like Asia and Latin 
America and how FDI actually worked in promoting development and economic 
growth that attracted further investments.  When the same comparison was made, 
he found that Africa is the one region that is still in poverty. According to Jeffrey 
Sachs (2004), thirty-three Sub-Saharan African countries have more than half of 
their population still living under $1 a day.  14 
 In overview FDI in Africa doesn’t have the same positive outcomes as in 
other regions of the world.  The investments are there but they somehow do not 
translate into higher economic development. Lumbila explores how FDI works in 
Africa. His study finds that aid boosts growth in regions where there is a “good 
                                                        
13 Kevin N. Lumbila. 2005. “What Makes FDI Work? A Panel Analysis of the Growth 
Effect of FDI in Africa.” 
14  
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policy environment.”15  Meaning perhaps that there is some level of good 
governance within the host country.  Transparency on the state level directly affects 
the growth of the states especially via FDI.  The investments can eventually translate 
into measurable development achievements.  
Development in Africa has lagged behind other continents for many years.  
Unlike other economies, Sub-Saharan Africa has struggled economically. Post-
colonial Africa’s GDP per capita in 1992 was approximately equivalent to that of 
Western Europe in 1820.16  The African continent has been disenfranchised from 
the dawn of ships landing on her shores. From mass transportation of people for 
slavery, to being colonized and used as an extractive wealth for the European 
empire. Sachs and Bloom point out that Africa started out in the global industrial 
and economic race with multiple strikes against it.  From colonial rule, slave trading, 
to weak institutions post-colonialism, ethnic division, geography (most tropical land 
concentration in the world), corruption and heavy dependence on primary exports.  
The slow growth in Africa can be determined by using any of the factors listed above 
as part of a larger picture that is the complex African economy.   
In researching for development, the paper will use the general principals laid 
out by the World Bank Development indicators. What I will be measuring is the rate 
of poverty, literacy and life expectancy. Bloom and Sachs (1998) use six factors of 
                                                        
15 Kevin N. Lumbila. 2005. “What Makes FDI Work? A Panel Analysis of the Growth 
Effect of FDI in Africa.” 
16 Bloom and Sachs. 1998. “Geography Demography, and Economics Growth in 
Africa” 
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development that affect the Sub-Saharan African countries.17 For the purpose of this 
paper, I have three of six factors laid out by Sachs. The three basic aspects of 
development I will use to examine the sampled countries are:  poverty, literacy and 
life expectancy.  Sachs states that countries with development issues in Africa suffer 
negatively from those three factors. My reason for selecting these factors over the 
other is because they are also the three measured factors in development. When 
researching data for development poverty margin, mortality rate and education 
enrollment are always the top indicators of social improvement or decline 
depending on the presented/collected data. The other factors were internal politics, 
economic politics and external conditions (i.e. colonization and slave trade).  
Poverty is high while GDP per capita is also unusually high than normal. Life 
expectancy is shorter due to lack of proper medical care.  Literacy rate is also lower 
because most children are unable to continue in school past primary to assist family 
in need.  It is not to say that there hasn’t been improvements in the rate of 
development since the end of colonial rule however, the progress made is far behind 
than the expected growth with the available wealth on the continent.  Other nations 
located in Asia and South America also suffered from the history of colonialism and 
tropical climates and yet they have managed to attain a sustainable method of 
development.  
The prospect of development seems to lie in the balance between 
transparency and good governance.  Achille Toto-Same (2008) explains and lays out 
the economic history of Equatorial Guinea before and after oil became a major 
                                                        
17 Bloom and Sachs. 1998. “Geography, Demography, and Economics Growth in 
Africa” 
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revenue earner of the state.  After independence, the state was extremely poor and 
mainly relied on fishing and agriculture as the main export. Mobil Oil started 
exporting oil in August of 1996.18  Since then the GDP of Equatorial Guinea has shot 
up, yet the main population remains at a poverty level.  Toto-Same explores the 
theory of the Dutch Disease. The phenomenon refers to the boom and bust cycle that 
is caused by an increase in exploitation of natural resources that causes the decline 
in agriculture and manufacturing. As Equatorial Guinea moves forward with oil 
production that accounts for over 90 percent of exports, will other sectors develop? 
What does this mean for the average citizen that is not in the oil industry.  
 Toto-Same correlates lack of development in Equatorial Guinea with two 
main factors, lack of governance and Dutch Disease.  The over development in the oil 
sector makes other non-oil exports less competitive and the majority of the human 
labor (about 80 percent)19 is in the non-oil sector.  Since the oil industry is the main 
and largest source of state revenue, any mismanagement of funds will affect 
development. This eventually leads to what is known as the “resource curse.”  
 The resource curse is a phenomenon that seems to be taking hold of 
oil/mineral exporting states in Africa.  The value of the commodity in the world 
market and the dependence of the State impact the resource curse. Precious 
resources such as oil are extracted and exported by multinational corporations 
(MNCs) operating within the host country.  Emeka Duruigbo explores the 
relationship between MNCs and the resource curse in Africa. In her report “The 
                                                        
18 Achille Toto-Same. 2008. “ Mineral- Rich Countries and Dutch Disease: 
Understanding the Macroeconomic Implications of Windfalls and the Development 
Prospects.” 
19 Ibid – Achille Toto-Same 2008. 
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World Bank, Multinational Oil Corporations, and the Resource Curse in Africa”, she 
finds a correlation between MNCs and lack of development in high exporting 
countries.  Oil rich countries ultimately experience extreme poverty, civil wars, 
human rights abuse and environmental degradation.20 She explores the role 
institutions play in facilitating this.  The report states that the combination of poor 
leadership by the State and MNCs with less than honorable agendas facilitate the 
resource curse.  There is a lack of accountability and transparency on both sides, 
states and MNCs.  
 Nicholas Shaxson (2007) brings forward the common notion before 1990’s 
that oil companies were the new imperial power taking advantage of Africa. He 
presents that since OPEC’s rise in 1970’s, oil exporters like Nigeria held larger 
revenues from oil companies than before.  This stark reality slowly restored the 
image of foreign oil companies as non-threatening.  Exxon Mobil spokesman 
Andre´Madec was quoted for saying “we don’t like to call it oil curse. We prefer to 
call it a governance curse.” 21Governance may have increased and each state has a 
larger stake on oil revenues, however it doesn’t exonerate any MNC from their 
crimes.  Shaxson (2007) also quotes Martin Wolf a Financial Times commentator:  
 “In a society when everyone cheats and takes or pays bribes, there’s little 
incentive not to join in.” 
                                                        
20 Emeka Duruigbo. (2005 )“ The World Bank, Multinational Oil Corporations, and the 
Resource Curse in Africa.” 
21 Shaxson (2007), “ Oil, Corruption , the Resource Curse” 
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Foreign firms are participants in the grand scheme of corruption as the politicians 
they bribe.  Corrupt politicians have a price and its called corruption and oil 
companies pay to get their piece of the pie.  
 Surprisingly, there isn’t much work on the theory that MNCs are also part 
takers in resource curse. There is an abundant collection of work theorizing that the 
resource curse is the cause of a single, not diverse and weakened economy along 
with corruption on a state level. However, there are few discussions on possibly 
assigning some responsibility to foreign corporations. After all, they are present to 
extract the resource and gain a substantial amount of wealth. Why is it presumed 
that they are innocent by standers and are simply there to perform a task under the 
watchful eye of the state. The nature of the state is corrupt therefore the nature of 
business conducted with MNCs is more than likely to be corrupt too.  In most cases 
that will be presented later on, MNCs are as corrupt as the leaders in the countries 
they operate in. There is evidence of bribery, illegal drilling license purchase and 
even financing civil wars.  
Duruigbo uses data from Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) to show that petroleum exporting countries have a lower rate of 
development than their counter part non-oil exporting nations. They also are more 
likely to endure civil wars and conflicts. These states also spend less on social 
welfare development programs but spend almost ten times more on military and 
security forces around oil resource locations. 22 
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The article calls for transparency by MNCs and host nations in monitoring oil 
revenues.  Duruigbo insists on the creation of trust funds and public reports of the 
use of funds to reduce the levels of corruption. MNCs would be obligated to show 
what they are paying for since there are reports of payments being made to state 
officials for favorable oil deals. There would be a full accountability of oil revenues 
and disclosures of oil receipts, which would contribute to proper use of funds.  
There seems to be subtle correlations between Multinational Corporations 
and lack of development.  E.D Oruonye suggests that the resource curse is brought 
on by increased globalization that brings an MNC into a host nation. Oruonye states 
that globalization has spread foreign investments and foreign firms to various Sub-
Saharan African countries23.  These MNCs in turn over exploit the land and violate 
indigenous people’s human rights. Oruoyne examines in his paper the 
environmental impacts that are caused by activities of oil companies in Sub-Sahara 
Africa.   
 Oruonye states that most Sub-Saharan environmental degradation can be 
linked to the negative contributions of oil MNCs,24 which in turn increases poverty 
in the region.  He samples a few states to analyze environmental degradation. 
Oruonye finds in Nigeria that the greenhouse gas emissions in the region are caused 
by gas flaring in the area from the process of oil exploration.  Also ancient oil 
pipelines lack maintenance and break down causing massive oil spills in the Niger 
delta.  As a result of the environment becoming toxic, residents are unable to live in 
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the area as resources dwindle and livelihoods are threatened.  There are many 
documented civil strife cases that are brought up in the paper to show that oil 
companies and military/security forces (on behalf of the state and MNC) go to 
extreme measures to protect their investments.  
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The Neo-patrimonial State and Governance  
 
 
The State: Patrimonial Relations  
 
 
 
 
 Decolonization took place in the 60’s and 70’s for most African nations but 
there are some countries that gained their independence much later such as the 80’s 
and so forth.  The old colonial system left a political gap with old institutions in 
place.  Colonial institutions were established to benefit the colonial empires and 
never to develop and sustain the colony. The purpose of the colonies was for 
extraction of raw materials that are then sent to Europe and made into marketable 
and profitable goods.  The profits benefitted the imperial rulers rather than to 
improve the colonies.   
Decolonization took place but the political and governmental institutions 
remained the same except there was no colonial rule.  The colonial rule had 
established a patronage relationship within the state. Patronage on state level had 
already been a fostered idea and a known way of governing for colonies.  When it 
came time to lead, leaders that filled in the shoes as statesman also inherited and 
perfected patrimonialism. Generally, those that were considered to have some sort 
of key figure during colonial rule or educated nationals rose to power. Some leaders 
were even Western educated and hard nationalists, which made for future state 
leaders after colonization ended.  
Post independence most African nations battled through dictatorship, 
autocrats, one party regimes and military takeovers.  The neo-patrimonial leader by 
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most scholars is described as being uniquely an African form of political leadership.  
Leaders have a more personal and patron/client like connections to their immediate 
subjects.  In such cases corruption is likely to occur since there is no accountability 
being monitored and checked because all subjects are benefiting on the side from 
the politician in office.  With weak institution and corrupt leaders, the state is bound 
for crisis and turmoil.  There is little development and progress in terms of the 
average citizen who struggles to live even in poverty. It is not to say corruption 
doesn’t exist in the Global North, however it is manageable to the point where the 
majority of society is able to not feel the effects of corruption within a country.  
 In the global south, corruption on a state level directly affects the 
development of the nation and the farewell of its citizens. The reason being is that 
the developing world is just that - developing and not fully equipped to support its 
entire population on a system.  The system is broken and remains broken until 
leaders sacrifice personal gain for national gain.  
 Angola gained its independence from Portugal in 1975. Once colonialism was 
over, there was a race for power between three primary groups. The Popular 
Movement for Liberation of Angola (MPLA), The National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (UNITA) and a small faction called the National Liberation 
front of Angola (FNLA).  The FNLA group eventually dissolved into UNITA as they 
held little numbers.  The next 27 years were plagued by a civil war waged out by 
MPLA troops and UNITA soldiers.  Current president Jose Eduardo Dos Santos was 
the leader of the MPLA front, who beat out Jonas Savimbi in a “legitimate election” 
on September in 1992. The opposition and their supporters didn’t feel it was a 
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legitimate win so another civil war broke out after elections that lasted until 2002.  
Wars that span almost three decades long robbed Angola of any chance at 
prosperity in its infant postcolonial state. Small opposition would rise and Dos 
Santos would suppress competition  by having radio stations and the Internet shut 
down. Dos Santos has remained in office since 1979. Eventually, China invested 
about $5 billion to rebuild Angola’s infrastructure that was destroyed in both civil 
wars.  According to Stephanie Hanson, she reports that in 2004 Global Witness 
investigated and found that $1.7 billion was un-accounted for between 1997-2001.25  
Dos Santos polices in office can be described as patrimonial. He appoints and 
replaces anyone in any government position.   
Corruption is not un-common in Angola’s as well as other nations.  There is 
evidence of bribery using oil and other extractive industries revenues. It is alleged 
that former UNITA members in office are paid of $15,000 a month in bribes from the 
official MPLA party, Dos Santos camp.26  Dos Santos benefits directly from the oil 
market.  The revenue from Sonangol, the state owned oil company, provides the 
capital to buy off alliance and favorable terms. Also some political figures have a 
stake into the company, as well as his eldest daughter who now manages Sonangol 
and makes her one of the wealthiest African woman. His public policies are far less 
from improving the current circumstances and possible prosperous future of 
Angola. Instead, top officials are paid off from lucrative sign on bonuses from oil 
companies.  More than 50 % of the government budget is spent on military.27  It is 
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proven throughout history that corrupt states spend a fortune on their military and 
external forces.  
 Equatorial Guinea is the only Spanish colony in Africa.  In 1968, what was 
known as Spanish Guinea gained its independence and became known as Equatorial 
Guinea.  Francisco Macias Nguema became the first president. His career began as a 
junior level officer in the Spanish colonial administration.  His rise to power should 
be no surprise as he already had experience under colonial rule so its only natural 
such an elite and favored by the former colonial empire takes head of state once 
colonization ended. Once Francisco got into office, he soon started appointing his 
own family members to key positions within the new government. The term 
Neguemism was born --a rule by a small family elite. 28 
 Geoffrey Wood goes on to explain the devastations that took place once 
Macias was in office. Macias totalitarian rule completely neglected governmental 
functions. Education, internal security and the economy crashed. The majority of the 
population was forced to go back to subsistence farming.  According Wood at one 
point the expulsion of Nigerian migrant workers led to a 90 percent drop in GNP. 
Also at least one third of the population in Equatorial Guinea had either been killed 
or exiled. 29 
In 1979, after a decade of civil strife, a coup took place with the lead of 
Teodor Obiang Nguema who was the Commander of the National Guard. He also 
happens to be Macias own nephew.  Obiang overthrew his uncle and took power.  
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The alleged last straw for Obiang to rise up against his uncle is the murder of his 
brother by his uncle Macias.  Macias had become paranoid and taken exile in his 
home village during his last years. In that time, he allegedly murdered his own 
nephew.  Obiang promised to end the Macias reign of excess years. Unfortunately, 
rather than end that, he too became a totalitarian leader. Obiang is still in office 
today.  Though the constitution was amended to allow multiple party competitions 
in 1980, there are only few political groups that are legal (some are banned) in the 
country and allowed to participate. However, corruption regarding elections is high. 
In December 2002 an election was held and it seemed as though that Obiang won 
97% of votes.  The opposition Celestino Bacale withdrew amid threats. 30 
Obiang continues to rule and divides up governmental positions between his 
family members. His son Teodorin is the minister of Forestry, while his other son 
Gabriel is head of Mining and Energy.  This is a classic example of the “patron” like 
preferential treatment patrimonial leaders practice.   
In 1960, Nigeria gained its independence from Britain.  The Northern elite 
and southern regions began to dispute on military corps appropriation that would 
lead into a three-year civil war.  The north wanted a larger assignment of military 
corps based on sheer size unlike the south that felt it should be 50/50.  The Nigerian 
military rose to power in 1966. Soon after an ethnic division based on region took 
place. The Biafra states (Eastern regions) were born as they seceded from Nigeria. 
As a result, a civil war broke out that lasted from 1967-1970. It is estimated that 
more than 500 thousand people lost their lives in the Biafran war. The first military 
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government was under General Ironsi. He was known to have his “kinsmen” as his 
advisors. As a result of this accusation he didn’t last long in power. Following the 
civil war in between the regions, General Gowen took power. During his time, 
Nigeria was able to expand her sector socially and economically using oil revenues. 
The patrimonial practice became evident and embedded into the society.  According 
to Ipke, Gowon had numerous post-war contracts with specific foreign businessmen 
that resulted in large kickbacks. 31   
Gowon’s rule ended  in 1976 due to a coup that was led by Murtala 
Muhammad. According to history, Muhammad was a product of Gowon’s patronage 
regime.  He was a principal actor in the 1966 coup to restore Northern dominance.  
The zeal of Muhammad only lasted six months in power. He appointed his successor 
General Olusegun Obasanjo who was supposed to follow the “anti corruption motto” 
of Muhammad.  However, Obasanio created organizations such as the Festival of 
Black and African Arts to restore the old patronage route as well as universities and 
schools.  After Obasanio, Babangida took power in 1985. He was known for buying 
large powerful groups for support.  Locally, this arrangement became known as 
“settlement”.  During his regime, he would depose of any officer in doubt of their 
loyalty and support.  His family lavished in immense wealth. His wife was reportedly 
worth $8 million while he was worth $30 million. 32  Among other things he has 
given numerous licenses to “client’s” to export crude oil illegally.  
In 1996, Abiola Abacha won the presidential election. He surrounded himself only 
with very few loyalists he trusted. It is reported that several major state contracts 
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were awarded to none other than his children. Though Nigeria has elections, it 
seems as though the same type of patrimonial leaders are elected and take office.  
State is the initial point where resource curse and lack of development takes 
shape.  It is the first of the three conditions for resource curse. My reason for stating 
this is that every place in Africa where some sort of resource curse has occurred, 
you can find a very week state with old institution that can not accommodate the 
ever changing needs of the extractive business. You will also find the resource is 
some form of mineral, oil or gas. According Hazel Mc Ferson, hyper-corrupt 
countries are associated with an abundant supply in mineral wealth. 33The 
extractive industry has been a major part of resource curse within the African 
continent.  There is a lack of proper governance and accountability, which leads to 
higher corruption. The state doesn’t tax its population and therefore has little 
incentive to remain accountable and far from corruption. The extractive industries 
make up for more than half of the revenues of Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial 
Guinea.  State leaders and those participating in the oil or extracted raw material 
business, tend to become corrupted and rule in a neo-patrimonial fashion. As 
pointed out, there is evidence of political payoffs for support and use of state funds 
for personal gain. 
 Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea all have officials that are considered 
neo-patrimonial.  Patrimonial practices can be found not only across the African 
continent but also globally.  It is not exclusive to Africa, however the neo-
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patrimonial practices by African leaders along with other conditions lead to a weak 
and vulnerable state for resource curse to take place.  
Scholars like Theobald, as referenced by Pitcher & Moran, have linked public 
administrations within neo-patrimonial states have lower development growth rate. 
According to Pitcher and Moran (2009), Theobald and Budd (1982) indicate that 
patrimonial states are less likely to have fundamental development growth 
economically and politically.  The main reason for these occurrences is that state 
officials often misappropriate state funds towards personal enrichment rather than 
internal investments into the state institutions like education, healthcare and job 
training. The state in turn is less likely to develop when social conditions have not 
been improved upon and the present institution lacks the power to enforce any 
form of accountability.   All three countries are publicly known to have had leaders 
that have used national wealth to increase their personal wealth. In Angola and 
Equatorial Guinea, the ruling party family has become extremely wealthy from state 
owned oil revenues. In Nigeria, state officials are known to receive kickbacks in 
exchange for a spotty oil contracts with MNCs.  
 The state is a governing body over its sovereign borders and citizens. The 
economy and the development of the country are one of the many duties for any 
state.  Proper governance is extremely important in these two sectors because lack 
there of leads into a financially weak and underdeveloped state.  So how does lack of 
good governance lead a nation into resource curse? The answer would be it is 
because of corruption and lack of accountability that robs a nation of its wealth and 
leads its natural blessings into a curse.  
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Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea are well known for their abundance of 
oil and as a result are large producers on the worlds oil market. Their annual income 
from oil exports are extremely high and yet, each state has lagged in development 
and suffers from resource curse. Those in office have not been held accountable for 
oil revenue receipts and management of state funds.  
 Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial Guinea all have a known reputation for being 
corrupted countries. From their top officials such as their presidents to others in 
office have been known to be corrupt.  According to Transparency International’s 
2014 corruption Index, Angola scored higher than Nigeria on levels of public sector 
corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa. Somalia being the highest and Botswana as the 
least corrupted in Africa.  Corruption in public sectors robs the economic growth 
and development of a nation and leaves its people in poverty.  Development 
requires capital and when funds are mismanaged and disappear with no 
accountability, the population suffers. 
 Rod Alence compares states that are restricted, non-democratic and 
democratic states. He uses this guideline to also measure the rate of development 
within each section.  I am not here to argue whether or not democracy should be 
adapted by African states. What I am merely trying to prove is that states that are 
more restricted or patrimonial and have an abundant resource that can translate 
into state wealth, often lack development and some even experience civil wars. In 
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Alence experiment, Nigeria fell under and non-democratic category while Angola 
and Guinea Bissau fell under “restricted”34. 
 Nigeria a “restricted” state is far from democratic and is also very rich in oil 
and gas resources. The combinations of those two lead to resource curse due to lack 
of good governance and the value of the commodity as well.  Nigeria also relies 
heavily on its oil and gas exports as it makes up more than 75% of the economy. 
 Angola is fairly new to their sudden wealth of oil unlike Nigeria.  Alence lists 
Angola under restricted. Restricted is explained as a restrictive government.  Angola 
has a GDP of $124.2 billion35 and oil has made it extremely wealthy, however the 
conditions of people’s lives are nowhere near improved. In fact they are declining 
and as a result, Angola receives aid money from the World Bank. The paradox of a 
wealthy nation receiving aid is interesting. It forces you to ask yourself where does 
the money go.  
 Though most states in Africa are patrimonial, not all suffer from resource 
curse with their commodities.  Pitcher, Moran and Johnston (2009) indentify 
perhaps why resource curse hasn’t affected Botswana even as a patrimonial state.  
The reason lies within the commodity and governance. Botswana, aside from 
diamonds, is also an agriculture state like cattle and has a robust tourism economy. 
They do have diamond deposits but according the Economist (2009)36, the 
diamonds are located deep underground and require time and large financial 
investments that would only pay out in the long term. Debsawna (state partnership 
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with De Beers) has closed down its diamond mines leaving out a gap in this specific 
extractive industry in Botswana. Botswana is in turn faced with turning to other 
exports to keep the economy going and GDP up. Granted there was a 40 percent 
slump as a result of the mines being closed, a resource curse never occurred.  
 Botswana has not suffered from any resource curse because their commodity 
is valued differently and the availability of it is also getting smaller. Their economy 
is no longer solely reliant on their income from their extractive industries. They 
have managed to cultivate and develop other sectors of their market such as 
agriculture and tourism through reserve and game parks. Botswana is also a fairly 
less corrupt state according to Transparency International (TI) 2014 Corruption 
Index publication. Their government manages to be accountable towards its people.  
Rod Alence also listed Botswana as a fairly democratic state.  The status of the state 
and the level of its “good governance” proves to have an effect on the outcome of its 
economic and social development.  Governments have to do their duties of being 
reliable, accountable for the sake of its own fate and the people.  If the few elites 
benefit and the rest of the population suffers, it is only a matter of time before 
severe hardships and poverty incite conflict to break out. The overall national 
development is also lower.  
 Patrimonial states are weak and lack the formal institutions and will power 
that would normally serve as a monitoring agency to deter corruption. However, it 
is based on old colonial patronage/clientele system and therefore continues to fail in 
the modern post-colonial era. Corruption will always exist on a certain level, 
however when it is the state that is corrupt then the ripple effects spread out far and 
 38 
wide.  Leaders would have to refrain from activities that would be seen as corrupt 
practices for personal gain and seek national gain and development through good 
and clean governance. Transparency is key to good governance. All state revenues 
from exports should be made public as well as the assets that are held by those in 
office.  State officials tend to have shareholders stakes in state owned companies. 
For those share holders in office, personal assets are sometimes mixed in with state 
profits. An example would be from Angola, where public officials held shares in a 
state oil company named Nazaki according to Forbes magazine.37  By holding such 
major shares in a state oil company, officials were able to profit off the revenues. 
Transparency International recommends the publishing of revenues deter 
corruption as the knowledge is available to the public and the government would 
have the public’s scrutiny.  
 A check and balance system is important for any government to keep 
themselves in check.  One branch cannot supervise or inspect itself, rather another 
branch would report unbiased to its own interests. A nation cannot move forward 
without having a strong government. The nation state begins at the governmental 
level and it is the foundation of any stable and well functioning sovereign nation.  
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Commodity Value 
Value to the State and Dependency  
   
Equatorial Guinea as a former Spanish colony relied on the Cocoa industry to 
provide for the economy. Cocoa production accounted for about 75% of the GDP 
prior to independence.38 Once Macias took office and led a 10-year terror on the 
country, the nation had lost civilians due to war or exile. The Cocoa industry 
plummeted and the Economy crashed in 1976 under Macias. Oil exploration took 
place first in 1967 by US Mobil, but it didn’t prove to be successful. In the 1980’s a 
Spanish company drilled in the same area as Mobil and was successful. By the 
1990’s Equatorial Guinea became a known producer in the oil and gas market. 
Further oil exploration took place with Mobil in 1995 and struck oil with a daily 
production of 40,000 barrels/day, that would later grow to 190,000 barrels/per 
day. 39 Once oil was discovered the government favored the industry due to its high 
cash output potential and went onwards with being an oil economy. 
 After the two civil wars, Angola lost most agriculture infrastructures and 
also man power. About half of the population was under the age of fifteen after the 
war.40 The war had taken its toll. Relying on agriculture to boost the economy was 
hopeless and there was no one to farm it.  Angola was a major coffee exporter under 
Portuguese colonial rule. Aside from coffee, Angola also exported maize. It exported 
approximately 400,00MT of maize annually and was the world’s fourth largest 
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coffee exporter prior to independence in 1975. 41 The first oil exploration took place 
in 1955 with French company Total. However oil didn’t have the same impact as it 
does now until after the 1980’s. Oil contract signing bonuses and advances provided 
quick capital that the government can use. Oil receipts also have dominated and 
make up for most of the GDP while agriculture that once was the main revenue 
source is down to almost zero. Oil slowly became the preferred export and what 
accounts for most of the national GDP.  
Nigeria is the oldest oil exporter of the three nations. Nigeria isn’t new to the 
oil league. Discovery of oil in Nigeria began in 1950.  The oil economy in Nigeria has 
played a significant part in politics. During the 1967-1970 civil war, ethnic groups 
struggled for control of the oil economy.  Once the war ended, Nigeria was able to 
recover from the war solely based on oil receipts.  The world oil shock followed by a 
boom and bust phenomenon took place in between the 1973’s and the 1990’s. 
Nigeria was able to profit from the high demands and cost of oil at this time as a 
result of being a member of OPEC. However, with the bust cycle, and the 
mismanagement of oil funds, the economy suffered. Nigeria artificially devalued the 
Nira in order to alleviate the pressure and also subsidized oil for domestic use. In 
this time frame, more and more cocoa farmers were leaving their farms and headed 
to urban cities for economic opportunities. 42The agriculture sector decreased and 
the reliance on oil increased.  
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The importance of the commodity to the state and its importance on the 
global market play as the second part to cause resource curse.  The value of the 
resource on the global market is very important. The level of importance will be 
determined by the assigned price and the availability. How many demands do we 
have and how many can we supply at a certain rate?  The oil, gas and mineral 
sectors are valued highly across the global market.  Oil supply has always been a 
contested subject since before the Gulf war.  We live in a world where we need oil 
because most things need oil to function. Though there is a new path for less oil 
dependency, oil and gas are still a necessity in the modern world.  Oil then becomes 
a widely desired commodity and therefore its value rises on the world market.  
 The value of a commodity to a state varies slightly from those of the global 
market. Developing states recognize that the commodity in question is their main 
“bread winner” for their economy.  The national GDP relies heavily on the export of 
this one commodity. This commodity tends to be in extractive minerals for most 
Sub-Saharan African nations. The heavy reliance on one part of a national export 
weakens the state and makes it vulnerable to crisis associated with the commodity 
because there is no diversification in the national market.  Other sectors of non-
traded goods within the economy are less developed and also don’t diversify which 
bring in less revenues. A Dutch Disease is soon to follow as a result of relying on one 
sector such as oil and gas and neglecting the development of other sectors. Sachs 
and Warner (1995) indicate that resource abundant states dependent on their 
resources will experience a low development rate compared to resource poor 
countries who do not depend on resources. States become more rentier states 
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where they rent most of their commodities and export in other sectors are low.  The 
more that is rented the less development takes place because an economy based on 
commodity has less potential to expand in the long run compared to a 
manufacturing and labor intensive market.43  An example would be is a state that 
relies only on mineral exports while agriculture, fishing and especially 
manufacturing make up a small percentage of the national GDP. The minerals will 
run out eventually, what then. 
 There is also the lack of diversity in the economic sector. An Example would 
be Angola’s agriculture sector. It only makes up 10 percent of the national GDP for 
201344. States affected by the resource curse are generally rentier states where their 
main national income is off the export of lucrative commodities such as precious 
minerals. States rely heavily on one sector such as oil, gold, and diamond and as a 
result depreciated other sectors of the economy causing the Dutch Disease. By 
focusing and investing everything into one area, the risk of failure becomes larger.  If 
you place all your eggs in one basket and the basket breaks, all of your eggs are now 
gone.   States rely too heavily on their extractive industries to support themselves. 
 According to Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and The 
New York Times, Nigeria is the number one oil exporter on the African continent.  
Per day, Nigeria exports 2.2 million barrels per day. Oil revenues make up 95 
percent of exports and 75 percent of government revenue.45  Nigeria has been 
exporting oil since the late 1960’s.  Aside from the government officials relying on 
                                                        
43 Ibid - Sachs Warner (1995) 
44 http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx 
45 http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/167.htm 
 43 
funds from oil revenues, the entire GDP relies on it since it makes up 95 percent of 
exports.  The agriculture sector is weak and low in annual revenues. 
 As a runner up, Angola is the second largest exporter of oil on the continent 
right after Nigeria. According to the IMF and World Bank Group, oil revenues make 
up 90% of all exports for Angola. It also accounts for 45% of the annual GDP. Oil 
revenues make up 75% of government revenues.46 The state is heavily dependant 
on its oil industry.  Angola depends on oil to supplement other sectors of their 
economy. Their annual agriculture sector only made up 10 percent of the GDP in 
2013.47  National oil dependency must be reduced in order to develop other sectors 
and export more in other goods than oil.  Reducing the national reliance on a 
commodity like oil reduces the chances of the state being affected by fluctuation in 
the market. 
 Equatorial Guinea is the seventh largest oil exporting state in Africa. Though 
it is not in the top five of oil producers in Africa, it is unique in size and population. It 
only has a population of 757,000 but with a GDP of $ 15.58 billion for 2013.48  It is 
not a member of OPEC.  According to the U.S department of Energy Information 
Administration, the oil and gas industry accounted for 95 percent of the GDP and 99 
percent of the exports in 2011.49  Based on such numbers, it would be accurate to 
assume that nearly all of Equatorial Guinea GDP and export revenue relies on the oil 
and gas industry.  Relying so heavily on one sector brings about vulnerability in 
                                                        
46 http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/147.htm 
47 http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/reports/tableview.aspx 
48 http://data.worldbank.org/country/equatorial-guinea 
49 http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=ek 
 44 
other sectors. If the oil and gas market took a down turn for some time, the nation 
will loose a significant amount of revenues. 
 So what does reliance on one sector mean for an economy? It means the 
economy is going to suffer each time there is a fluctuation in the market.  Also oil is 
not a renewable energy source so eventually it will run out, what then if most of the 
states exports are from non-renewable source. Like Gabon, these other nations will 
face the same fate of dwindling resources. Just like the resource dry up, so will the 
revenues and in turn affect the GDP negatively.  A nations development is hindered 
if the economy is not growing. There will be no jobs, there will be budget cuts from 
the public sector that is already struggling and would need subsidies for basic 
necessities.  
 Sachs and Warner (1995) sample various countries from around the world to 
test whether or not the effects of natural resources have on economic growth. They 
find that resource rich countries have higher levels of income but at the same time 
have negative economic growth. The opposite would be resource poor countries 
have lower income but higher growth in the long run.  The main assumptions here is 
that one, the resource abundance is temporary therefore will eventually dwindle 
and the second is that resource abundant economies have an unsustainably high 
level of income.50 An example of this would be Equatorial Guinea. The population is 
under 1 million and the GDP per capita is $14,320 and yet 3 out of 4 people are 
living in poverty.51  
                                                        
50 Rodriguez and Sachs (1999), “Why do Resource- Abundant Economies Grow More 
Slowly” 
51 http://data.worldbank.org/country/equatorial-guinea 
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Megan Clark states (2014): 
 “…Dependence on crude production leaves the country vulnerable to global oil 
prices. Despite an IMF-supported Sovereign Wealth Fund and positive outlook for the 
next few years, governance problems and a lack of other sector development will 
continue to challenge development and has some observers dubious.” 
 At what rate can resource dependency be beneficial towards the state and 
have a higher economic growth rate? Does resource dependency lead to resource 
curse? The answer is not 100 percent clear, because there are many states like Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar and Kuwait that are oil dependent and yet there has not been a 
resource curse. The assumption would be that it is a combination of factors such as 
the level of dependency, good governance and access to the resource.  There is 
evidence that easily lootable resources affect state security.  The assumption is that 
states with resource that can easily be accessed by rebel groups will endure longer 
conflict periods.  An example would be diamonds in southern portions of Africa, 
they are located in deep shaft mines making them hard to access without technical 
know how and tools. Diamonds in western Africa are closer to the surface and can 
easily be reached without the use of heavy machinery. Many rebel militia groups 
have financed their organization by using such easy access diamond.  Also, level of 
governance and management of natural resource are a factor.  A form of resource 
management aside from overseeing exports and revenues is the resource-extracting 
agents; MNCs. Multinational Corporations play a role in resource curse. This is not 
to state that they are the cause as the true single cause can’t be identified but merely 
a culprit.  
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MNCs In LDCs 
  
A Love Hate Relationship 
 
 
 
 The presence of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) in the developing world 
is larger than ever. Foreign Direct Investments is exponentially increasing compared 
to the past few years and are expected to grow larger as stated earlier on in the 
paper. As FDI grows, the presence of MNCs in Less Developed Countries (LDCs) 
increases. Corporations and their subsidiaries spread in developing countries, but 
the relationship doesn’t always have the most positive outcome. The business 
strategies of oil corporations bring large sums of capital to the host countries, but 
they also bring of host of issues like environmental problems and social problems. 
The idea of sustainable development has been around for over twenty years. While 
some MNCs are forging sustainable development as part of their business goal, oil 
and gas MNCs in Africa fall short of doing so.  Why you may ask, because of lack of 
corporate responsibility and enforcement of regulations.  
 The sustainable development argument breakdown into sub-categories for 
MNCs in the oil and gas industry. These categories’ are climate change, biodiversity, 
renewable energy and social investment.  The achievement of these categories is 
reliant on social pressure from either international institutions, governments or 
NGO otherwise corporate responsibility is not a first response to MNCs in the oil 
sector, it must be coercive.  There has to be someone watching and requesting they 
abide by international standards that are set like the Kyoto Protocol, an 
international agreement where developed nations must reduce their Green House 
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Gas (GHG) emissions by 5.2% by 2010. Even though social development and social 
issues that are brought on by MNCs are part of the sustainable development 
discussion, it is less a talked about subject since there are no major agencies 
(regulators) pushing for this cause like there is for climate change and renewable 
energy. Such neglect has caused sever damages to rural communities in oil rich 
countries.   
 Escobar and Vredenburg (2011) state that according to Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment (2005) reports that corporations are degrading 60 percent 
of the world’s ecosystem services.52  In the Niger Delta of Nigeria, the evidence of 
MNC and its degradation of the environment are clear.  Royal/Dutch had a large oil 
spill in 2011 that was widely announced on most media outlets. According to Shell, 
90 percent of the spill has been cleaned up.  The remainder of the supposed 10 
percent has made the land into a wasteland and is inhospitable to humans and 
wildlife in the region. Oil exploration in the Niger Delta has been the main reason for 
the major loss of ecosystems within the delta region.  Such irresponsible corporate 
behavior leads to severe environmental destructions that affect the native people 
who live in the area.  The is a lack of regulations on oil exploration and as a result, 
MNC’s tend to disregard other issues except for the bottom line of revenues.  Aside 
from the environmental effects, indigenous people are loosing their homes and way 
of life.  
 Ken Saro-WiWa was an indigenous activist for the Ogoni people in the Niger 
Delta. Oil exploration in the region was driving out natives from their homeland due 
                                                        
52 Escobar & Vredenburg (2011), Multinational Oil Company’s and the Adaption of 
sustainability p. 50 
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to the dwindling resources caused by gas flares in the area. The Methane gas that is 
released from the oil pipelines causes the air to be polluted and brings about health 
issues. Oil spills and run offs’ also decimated the wildlife that was crucial to natives 
gathering and growing food. Unfortunately for Ken Saro-Wiwa, he was executed by 
the military on orders from the government.  Shell supported the military 
government in order to secure its investments. 
 Aside from environmental degradation, MNC’s are often corrupt.  Corrupt in 
the sense where there have been large sums of pay offs for drilling licenses, land 
rights and so forth.  One prime example is the US company Cobalt International 
Energy Inc in Angola.  According to Forbes article, Cobalt had partnered with an 
Angolan oil company Nazaki. A company that was later discovered to have been 
secretly owned by state officials, state officials with records of large sums of 
payment missing. The allegations are that oil tax revenues were being funneled to 
the government. Angolan law states that no politician can have ownership of state 
and private enterprise.  The loophole is that this law doesn’t cover politician’s 
friends and therefore politicians can benefit indirectly. Though Cobalt argued it had 
no knowledge of the owner of Nazaki since Sonangol assigned it to Cobalt.  Such 
negligence by oil corporations only shows the lack of transparency between 
government agencies and oil corporations.  Frances Copolla states that according to 
the Open Source Initiative Report (2011):53 
 “…Multinational oil companies do not address governance or transparency issues in 
Angola. The companies’ continued transactions with the government – without calling 
                                                        
53 Frances Coppola (2014), “Cobalt International Energy: Oil, Angola, Corruption” 
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the terms of the transactions into question – have facilitated patronage problems, rent 
seeking and exacerbated the resource curse. Some exceptions exist, but these rare 
efforts are not industry wide. Companies tout their CSR projects, but these projects 
often lack community input, and never address transparency and human rights issues. 
In relation to the mitigation of impacts, multinationals get almost a free pass. There 
have been some efforts to hold multinationals to account, particularly through home-
country anti-corruption instruments and civil society advocacy, but these need to be 
ramped up.” 
Corruption and bribery runs rampant in states with low development and 
high commodities. Oil companies are known to pay bribes and give expensive lavish 
gifts to leaders and government officials in return for favorable deals in oil licenses. 
In 1977 the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act outlawed bribery of any company to 
foreign officials. This was in response to an investigation that turned up more than 
400 US companies had made illegal payments to governments in foreign countries.54 
In the case of Equatorial Guinea, corruption reaches to the President. Walter 
International Inc was financially supporting President Teodoro Obiang’s son to 
attend Pepperdine University in California.  According to Bloom’s article, nearly fifty 
thousand dollars a year was being spent on Obiang’s son. Soon after, large 
companies such as ExxonMobil and Texaco were drilling for oil off shore.  Such 
business practices are all too common in the oil industry across Africa. Oil 
companies are willing to bribe and spoil government officials and their families 
                                                        
54 Justin Bloom (2004), “U.S Oil Firms Entwined in Equatorial Guinea Deals” 
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rather than invest in social programs that would be considered as legitimate 
business practices. 
Escobar and Vredenburg (2011) examine the adaptability of sustainable 
development within the oil and gas sector.  Though there is an argument that social 
investment is unlikely by MNCs because it goes against their business strategies.  
They find that it is not impossible for MNCs to adapt sustainable development as 
part of their strategies. The mechanism would be normative isomorphism, where is 
one does it and shows that it is financially fit for the business, others will follow suit.  
A social investment doesn’t mean buying temporary items for a village or paying a 
fee but forming a long-term commitment in the community and enabling the 
community to develop and prosper.  The oil is the commodity that companies are 
profiting from and should in return invest in the region.  
Multinational Corporations are violating the land they seek to profit from and 
also displacing people from their natural homes such as the Ogoniland residents.  
Such violation spiral an already weak state and system into resource curse.  The 
state is not fully capable of monitoring MNCs behavior and in some cases; politicians 
are also in business with the MNCs and are equally causing the problem at hand 
while the few minority benefits.  There are many cases across the African oil 
industries where bribery and profiteering take place.  State officials should consider 
the long-term effect of corruption for their citizen because while they profit, the 
people suffer.  
Multinational Corporations are positioning themselves to profit from 
resources in such area without the return of social development.  I can’t simply 
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assign all responsibility to the MNC as they are a business entity and the main goal is 
to make money. However, the state should have regulations that require the MNCs 
to adhere to in order to continue business and profit. Oil drilling license renewals 
and approvals should be based on ethics rather than side payments. The MNC and 
state are both responsible where as the MNCs is the extracting agent and the state is 
the regulating agent.  
 The lists below give an idea as to which oil corporation are operating in  
each country. You will notice an overlap of similar companies in all three nations.  
 
In Nigeria 
 
 
Shell Petroleum Development Company Ltd 
Mobil Producing Nigeria Unlimited 
Chevron Nigeria Ltd 
Texaco Overseas Nig. Petroleum Co. Unltd 
Elf Petroleum Nigeria Limited 
Philip & Pan Ocean Oil Corporation 
Bought Over Ashland Oil Nigeria Limited 
Agip Energy & Natural Resources 
Statoil/ BP Aliance 
Esso Exploration & Production Nig. Ltd 
Texaco Outer Shelf Nigeria Limited 
Total (Nig.) Exploration & Prod. Co. Ltd. 
Amoco Corporation   
Chevron Exploration& Production Co 
Conoco 
Abacan 
                                                           
*Source for data   
http://www.nipc.gov.ng/intcomp.html 
In Angola: 
 
 
Exxon Mobil 
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Chevron Corp 
Texaco 
BP ( UK) 
Sonangol 
Plus Petrol ( Peru) 
Somoil (Angolan private firm) 
Marathon Oil 
Elf Aquitaine  
Eni (Italy) 
Petrobras ( Brazil) 
Sinopec (china) 
Maersk Oil (2006) 
AGIP ANGOLA LTD 
BP ANGOLA 
CABINDA GULF OIL COMPANY LTD. (CABGOC) 
CNR (RANGER OIL LTD) 
 
*Data Source 
 http://www.omnimap.com/catalog/int/angola-gas.htm 
 
 
In Equatorial Guinea: 
 
 
Ge Petrol 
Sonagas 
Novamark 
Elegance 
G3 Oleo E Gas 
Mobil 
Exxon Mobil 
Xuan Energy Limited 
Marathon Oil 
 
*Data Source 
http://www.equatorialoil.com/Petroleum_Exploration_history.html 
 
 
Corruption, High GDP and Poverty 
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 Listed are a few numbers to put corruption into perspective along with how 
high GDP’s can be and yet still have larger amount of the population in poverty.  
 
Table. A 
Country 
 
Transparency Int’l Corruption Index 
                              2014 
 
Qatar 69 
Botswana 63 
Bahrain 49 
Kuwait 44 
Niger 35 
Nigeria 27 
Angola 19 
Venezuela  19 
Equatorial Guinea *N/A 
*Data Source: Transparency International Corruption Index 2014 
 
The scoring ranges from 1-100. One being the most corrupt and 100 being the least 
corrupt.  I have arranged the states in order from the least to the most corrupt 
according to Transparency International.  Each state is also an oil-exporting nation.  
Table. B 
Country GDP in 2014 Primary School 
Attendance 2014 
Poverty level 
Nigeria $568 Billion 85% 46% 
Qatar $211.8 Billion 103% none 
Botswana $15.81 Billion 108% 19.3% 
Angola $131.4 Billion 104% 36.6% 
Eq. Guinea $14.3 Billion 91% 76.8% 
Bahrain $33.87 Billion 104% none 
*Data Source: World Bank Data Bank  
 
Table B represents the extremely high GDP attached with high poverty rates. The 
nations with the largest percentage of their population in poverty have suffered 
from the resource curse. All states listed are rentier states.  
The Curious Case of Kuwait 
 
Resource Blessing Not A Curse 
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 Today, Kuwait has a population of 3.479 million as of 2014 with a GDP of $ 
175.8 billion. 55 Kuwait city, which is the capital of Kuwait, is the oldest and original 
larger settlement of Kuwait. Bedouin and pastoral Arab tribes from the Arabian 
Peninsula moved across the dessert and Kuwait City was born.  The city was 
segmented between the elite ruling families descending from tribes and merchants 
as the businessmen of the city. The lower class were the laborers.  The economy was 
mainly fishing, pearling, shipbuilding and trading of goods.  The laborers and some 
slaves from the African continent worked in this sector.   
Ruling families can be identified as ethnic Arabs and Sunni. Based on this 
distinction the two most powerful families were the Al-Sabah and the Al-Khalifa. 
Due to a disagreement the families had a falling out which led to the Al-Khalifa 
moving out of Kuwait city and eventually ending up in Bahrain. The family still rules 
Bahrain till this day. The Al-Sabah family became the chosen ruling family of Kuwait 
starting 1752. 56 The Al- Sabah family is still the ruling family today and will most 
likely remain this way for generations to come.  
The structure of the government is strictly for the royal family. The cabinet is 
chosen from the royal family and elite merchant families with ties to the royal family 
from intermarriage.  They make up the elite ruling first class citizens of Kuwait. 
                                                        
55 http://data.worldbank.org/country/kuwait 
56 Meshaal Jaber Al Ahmad Al Sabah. (2013) “Recourse Curse Reduction Through 
Innovation: A blessing for all, the case of Kuwait.” 
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  In 1899 Kuwait became a proctor of Britain.  The move came after Sheik 
Mubarak Al- Sabah requested the aid of the British Empire. Britain did comply with 
joy to fend of any other European including German interest using the Gulf Port. 57 
During this period, Britain and Kuwait had a cliency relationship, Kuwait being the 
client.  Cliency is described by Mark Gasiorowski, as a strategic relationship between 
a strong state and a weak state where goods are exchanged for security services. 58 
Britain would offer security assistance against any internal and external threats. 
Externally, Iraq as a next-door neighbor always flirted with state borderlines and 
wanting to claim Kuwait as a province of Iraq based on old tribal beleifs.   
Mubarak requests aid from Britain to aid in border security between Iraq and 
Kuwait. Mubarak also known as “Mubarak the Great” ascended into power after 
murdering his two brothers.  Muhammad was the ruler and Jarrah was his closest 
advisor. It is described that Mubarak was encouraged to take place instead of his 
brother to slow down the “Iraqization” of Kuwait.  Mubarak assassinated his 
brothers and took power and ruled from 1896-1915 as one of the most feared rulers 
in Kuwait. 59  
Oil was first discovered in 1938 during oil exploration drillings led by BP and 
Gulf Oil which is now Kuwait Oil Company (KOC) after it nationalized in 1975. 
However, the first oil shipment didn’t take place until 1946. As Japanese cultured 
pearls saturated the market and ships were being built in the industrialized 
European region, Kuwait now had a new resource to depend upon that would prove 
                                                        
57 MERIP. (1975). “ Kuwait” 
58 Mary Ann Te´treault.  (1991).  “Autonomy, Necessity, and the Small State.” 
59 Ibid 
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to be more lucrative than pearling and shipbuilding.  In 1946 Kuwait’s oil income 
was $ 760,000. 60 Kuwait gained its independence from Britain on June 19, 1961.  As 
a strong state, post independent Kuwait created the “Ash Shuaybah Industrial Zone” 
in 1964.  This allowed the state to use oil funds for state development. A water 
distillation and electricity plant were built as well as the expansion of ports and 
manufacturing items like chlorine, cement and asphalt. As part of the redistribution 
of oil funds, there was also a large scale expansion on education programs, 
healthcare and housing privileges afforded to Kuwaiti citizens.  In the 1950’s the top 
three main portions of the national budget went to public works, education and 
healthcare expansion. 61 Healthcare and education (up to university level) are free 
for Kuwaiti citizens.  Under the new welfare state, population in Kuwait tripled from 
1957-1975 from 113,622 to 470,123. 62 
Today Kuwait’s oil and gas sector makes up for 60 percent of the national 
GDP and 95 percent of export revenues.  Kuwait oil field produces about 3.2 million 
barrels per day. 63 The national GDP stands at $175.8 billion for 2013 according to 
the World Bank.  Kuwait continues to state build and provide a formidable social 
welfare system for its population using their oil revenues. 
  The major reasons resource curse occurs is the lack of resource 
management that don’t translate into national advancement.  Kuwait has been 
building its internal infrastructure and social welfare system since they began 
                                                        
60 Shafeeq Ghabra. (1997). “Kuwait and the Dynamics of Socio-Economic Change”. 
61 Meshaal Jaber Al Ahmad Al Sabah. (2013) “Recourse Curse Reduction Through 
Innovation: A blessing for all, the case of Kuwait.” P.27 
62 Ibid-- Shafeeq Ghabra. (1997). 
63 http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/165.htm 
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exporting oil.  It has also been expanding to become more diverse and not so 
dependent solely on oil revenues.  Kuwait manufactures building materials for 
homes, cement, chlorine and also asphalt.  This is small in comparison to oil but yet 
an important sector that aids Kuwait in exploring different economic avenues for 
revenues.  
Like other oil exporting nations there are foreign oil corporations that are 
involved in Kuwait. These are the major oil companies that are across the globe in 
many states, including the African nations previously discussed. Figure one list all 
major foreign oil company involvement in Kuwait. 
Kuwait: 
Bristish Petroleum Co. Plc 
Chevron 
Getty Oil. Co 
Gulf Oil 
Japan’s Arabian Oil Co 
Mobil Corp. 
Royal Dutch/ Shell 
Shell International Petroleum Co. Ltd 
Texaco 
Total 
 
*Data Source http://www.virginia.edu/igpr/APAG/apagoilcompany.html 
 
 Unlike in my three cases Angola, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea, there is no 
previous work or articles that mention MNC corruption in Kuwait.  I find it ironic 
that the same companies found in Africa behave differently in the Persian Gulf.  Is it 
safe to assume perhaps there are stricter monitoring and regulations in Kuwait 
versus in Angola, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea?  Meshaal Jaber points out on page 
71 figure 3.6 Kuwait’s scores as assessed by Transparency International 2013 
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report. Kuwait scores 116 out of 163. The scale indicates one being the worst and 
163 being the least.  Just one year later Transparency International Corruption 
Index report shows that Kuwait has improved significantly 2014.  Kuwait scores a 
44 out of 100. One being the worst and 100 being the least corrupt.  Based on this 
assessment Kuwait is working its way to being less corrupt and having good 
governance. This was not the case in 2005. According to an IMF report presented by 
Meeshal Jaber, among resource rich countries governance scale, Kuwait lay smack in 
the middle of bad governance and good governance.  Since then Kuwait has 
tremendously improved its track record for governance and social investment.  
 Though Kuwait is not a democratic nation, it manages to have a sense of good 
governance among its people. There is clear indication that oil revenues have 
benefited the state and the citizens in the form of free education and healthcare. 
Also low-income housing are available through the government. Though oil 
accounts for majority of exports, it is not the only revenue.  Kuwait is expanding and 
developing a technology sector and skill sector with its high rate of university 
graduates. Since the exporting of oil, Kuwait has used the windfall of excess capital 
to build its self from a sustenance society to a high income one in matter of 50 years. 
Kuwait like Botswana hasn’t suffered a resource curse because they manage their 
resource blessings with good policies and accountability. The population is also 
directly successful due to the behavior of the state.  In the end, the state will always 
be responsible for the welfare of its people as it is the sovereign ruler within its 
borders.  
  
 60 
Summary 
 
 In summary, resource curse is the result of mismanagement of natural 
resource. The resource is not the curse but the way it is managed.  The same 
resource has been identified in four different nations across two continents. Oil 
doesn’t seem to have the same negative effects in Kuwait as it does in Angola, 
Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea.  The variables of government, economic dependency 
and MNCs were clearly identified in all four.  The difference lies within these 
variables. In states where governance is weak with high rates of corruption along 
with minimal social investment and state building, resource curse is present.  
Angola, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea have extremely high levels of 
corruption that basically hinder development. State funds are continuously 
unaccounted for and billions of dollars simply vanish.  There is no investment into 
building infrastructures and creating a social welfare program.  Majority of the 
population in corrupt states still live in poverty with no access to healthcare, 
education (post primary school) or housing. However, Kuwait presents a good 
example of what good governance and management of resource wealth looks like. 
Kuwait maintains a good governance track record (as pointed out by Transparency 
International) with good policies. It invests oil revenues into building state 
infrastructures, by providing free education, healthcare and housing 
accommodations. It is also diversifying its economy by manufacturing chemicals and 
investing into the tech industry. 
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 Commodity dependency also creates a weakness in the economy. It becomes 
extremely vulnerable to volatile price fluctuations.  There is also the ever-present 
reality that these resources will eventually tap out. At that point if the state hasn’t 
made other investments to cover itself from the decline and loss of a sector, the 
internal economy will suffer greatly and head towards a crash.  By relying solely on 
one sector, states neglect to explore and develop other economic avenues that could 
earn them revenues.  Resource curse becomes a likelihood reality for resource 
dependent states  as other sectors of their economy continue to depreciate. 
Botswana was one nation mentioned several times throughout many working 
papers during my research.  Apparently, there was the stereotype assumption that 
all African resource rich countries are headed to resource curse due to 
patrimonialism. Botswana was brought up several times across many articles as an 
example that this assumption was not true. Botswana has an abundant supply of 
diamonds but it is not their only source of revenue. By diversifying into agriculture 
and tourism, Botswana has evaded the resource curse. Also Botswana scores better 
than Kuwait on the Transparency Corruption Index report. Their government is 
transparent in state fund management and as a result the government is more 
accountable towards its actions.  
Lastly, the Multi National Corporations (MNCs) play a role in resource curse 
only in states where there is no or little policy governing their actions. It would be a 
far reach to entirely blame all of the problems on MNCs as the new imperials within 
a state. However, they are not free of blame either in places like the Niger Delta.  
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They may not be the main cause of resource curse but they are a culprit in the 
process. How you may ask. Well let’s look at Nigeria, Angola and Equatorial; there is 
clear evidence of corruption within in MNCs ranging from oil spills that are still not 
fully cleaned up to  bribery and funding rebel groups in hopes of better oil contracts 
once the rebels take over the government.  However, in the same breath the same 
companies that are caught red handed behaving in an appalling manner, do not 
misbehave in Kuwait. Is there a different sort of respect for the Arabian nation and 
leader? I don’t know but I do find that there are strict policies within Kuwait on 
MNCs and it becomes in their best interest to abide by the rules and conduct 
themselves in a corporate responsible way.  
Places like Angola, Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea have very little policies 
governing MNC’s causing them to show their true greedy and careless ways. There 
can be no other explanation for their behavior in the same industry on two 
continents. I doubt African leaders are forcing them to act corrupt, they are more a 
less following the leader.  
 Without the reduction of corruption on state level, the rest of the variables 
follow a domino effect. The state is the primary actor, the more accountable they are 
the less corrupt they become. With less corruption and better management of funds 
the better the state develops. The more the nation develops the better the regulating 
policies are designed. The better policies in place the less corrupt MNCs become. It 
is all on the same equation. The curse lies with the management and not the 
resource.  Accountability, transparency and good governance can cure and curb 
resource curse.  
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